Is a Synod supposed to follow Democratic procedures?⤒🔗

To what degree should a synod bother itself over how many churches are in favour or against a particular point on its agenda?

Synod Carman 2013 thought that at least with respect to the issue of women voting, this was important. Carman observes in Article 110 that nine churches appealed the decision of Synod Burlington Article 176; it also notes that at Synod Burlington "the majority of letters opposed women voting." It further mentions in consideration 3.6 that of the thirty-four letters that Synod Burlington 2012 received, four were in favour of allowing women to vote and nineteen were explicitly against. Synod then went on to argue in the same paragraph that in a matter so contentious it is desirable that a synod listen to the pref­erence of the churches.

There are a number of problems with this argument, however. For one thing, if there were thirty-four letters at Synod Burlington, four in favour and nineteen against, it would seem that of those thirty-four, there were elev­en churches to whom it did not matter very strongly; furthermore, if there were fifty-four churches in the fed­eration at the time, there were another twenty that never wrote in – presumably, it did not matter to them either. This means that to thirty-one out of fifty-four churches it apparently did not matter whether women participated in the election of officebearers. The line of reasoning of Synod Carman 2013 appears to fall apart therefore, be­cause the majority of the churches did not feel strongly about the matter, and hence Burlington 2010 did exactly what the majority of the churches seem to have wanted: left the matter in the freedom of the churches.

Secondly, if this is the way a synod is going to make its decisions, should that not be clear to the churches be­forehand so that they can be sure to "vote" on the matter?

But there is another difficulty with this argumen­tation – namely, the fact that it really should have no place at a Reformed synod. Rather than busying itself counting heads, attention should be paid to what is bib­lical, Reformed, and edifying to the churches. Reformed churches profess that they may not consider "the great multitude" to be of equal value with the Word of God (BC, Art. 7). Even if no church is in favour of something, and it is the clear teaching of Scripture, a synod should feel compelled to follow Scripture. And if something is not clearly contrary to Scripture and confession, what right does a synod have to forbid it? Besides, is it really right for churches to be telling a synod the way in which it would vote on given issues? If that is the nature of synod, why not simply hold a computerized referendum and save all the expense? Reformed churches have al­ways seen their assemblies as deliberative bodies rather than representative. That means that churches ought to be presenting biblical and confessional argumentation of benefit to the members of synod, so that a synod can be what it is meant to be.

On this point as well, Synod Carman has gone off in a direction that is less than Reformed.

A matter that belongs to the Churches in common?←⤒🔗

Carman also noted a number of times that several churches considered the matter of women voting to be a "matter for the churches in common" (Observation 2.2.1). In its Considerations (3.2), Carman also reiterates that many synods have seen this matter as a "matter for the churches in common." Interestingly, Carman goes on to point out that:

None of the Synodical pronouncements mentioned above have explained why the churches have con­sidered this matter as belonging to the churches in common. But over the years this was the commonly accepted practice. This practice has the more au­thority because churches repeatedly stated that the matter was federational. To alter course would re­quire an argument explaining why a new practice is necessary.

This is an odd line of reasoning. If something is wrongly held to be a matter of the churches in common and sev­eral synods reiterate that it is a matter of the churches in common, then the position that it is a matter of the churches in common is said to be even stronger. Here the issue is considered a matter of the churches in common not because so many churches have said so, nor because of some rationale (synod does not know what that ration­ale would be!) but because so many synods have said it so very often! So, does something that is untrue actually become true because it is said so often? And Carman then says: while we're not too sure why we are on this track, if someone wants to get us off it, they will have to provide the rationale for that new practice. Otherwise, we'll just keep doing what we're doing regardless! I real­ize that Article 33 of the CO is behind this, which says that matters once decided may not be proposed without being substantiated by new grounds; but the fact is that Article 33 is often applied in a rather arbitrary manner – this issue is a case in point, as it is difficult to see what exactly where the substantial new grounds that allowed Carman to overturn the Burlington decision.

But that is not the only odd line of reasoning we find in Article 110. In Consideration 3.7, Carman 2013 notes that this matter has long divided the churches and that there is a need to build a broader consensus among the churches before changing the practice of male-only voting. And so Synod states that "if any of the churches, after study, and based on biblical evidence, comes to the conclusion that the practice of male-only voting should be changed, this church ought to work on building a con­sensus among the churches by going the ecclesiastical way, through classis and regional synod, before the mat­ter ends up at the table of general synod."

But is this not a significant shift in church pol­ity? A synod cannot have it both ways. If the issue of women voting is a matter of the churches in common, then according to our own church polity, it belongs at the broadest major assembly – general synod. Article 30 of the Church Order clearly states that "A major assem­bly shall deal with those matters only ... which belong to its churches in common." And if it is a matter of the churches in common, every classis or regional synod that would be asked to deal with this matter would actually be bound – by Article 30 its own Church Order – to de­clare the matter inadmissible, as it belongs at the assem­bly which deals with all matters in common – the general synod. I am sure it was not intended, but in this way, the decision of Carman 2013 will only frustrate those who disagree with its conclusions and tie the assemblies of the federation into hopeless knots.

There is another avenue.

And that is to simply acknowledge that female par­ticipation in the voting process is not a matter on which the Scriptures, confessions, or church order speak so unequivocally about that it has to be a matter of the churches in common.

The fact is that there are some things that a synod should not attempt to regulate. There are, for example, a variety of practices throughout the churches with re­spect to tie votes; some churches regulate that in such an instance, the elder brother will be chosen, some will cast a lot, and others might call for a re-vote. Wisely, synod has never been asked to regulate this matter but has left it in the freedom of the churches. Despite forty years of discussion, synods can obviously not decide this issue of women voting either, and thus it should not try to regulate the matter. Where a church is convinced that women can participate without jeopardizing the biblical position of the men and women under her supervision, a church should be allowed to do so. Where a church is not convinced, she should decide accordingly. Uniformity is not necessary for unity.

Also on the wider scene, there is merit in allowing freedom on the point. The fear is of course that if we al­low women to vote now, we will be allowing them in of­fice in subsequent years, and examples can be cited. But there are also other examples of federations where this is not the case. The logic does not always hold. The slope is not always slippery; sometimes it's not even a slope! If anywhere we might have expected that a federation would have reversed its approach because of this fear, it is with the United Reformed Churches; leaving the CRC because of women in office, they did not feel compelled to deny the sisters the privilege of voting, but left this in the freedom of the churches. Today, I understand, most URCNA churches follow that practice, and there is no controversy. So too many Presbyterian churches that we acknowledge do likewise.

Besides, what should guide us in this is Scripture alone. Some churches have rightly pointed out that today's culture should not drive the church's agenda. True, but the church's agenda should not be driven by a Canadian Reformed culture or tradition that we have developed over the decades either. Scripture alone. And those Scriptures speak clearly enough about the question of women in office, as I have argued elsewhere.¹. But that they forbid women from stating their preference regarding which men should serve in office, no one has really proven.

Conclusion←⤒🔗

It really does not matter to me whether women vote for officebearers. In part, because I am male, and in part because it is not a major concern to the women who are close to me presently. I don't believe either that whether women vote nullifies any previous or future elections of officebearers; local regulations do not obstruct the hand of God in directing his will for his church. But what does matter to me is when ecclesiastical assemblies begin to make decisions on the basis of premises that are neither scriptural nor Reformed. In the church of Jesus Christ, not every action needs to be biblically based. If everyone agrees that women should not vote and all are content with that, that's fine. If some churches wish to include the women, and others exclude – that's fine as well. Unity is not dependent on uniformity. But as soon as one church or more begins to exercise the freedom that they believe they have, those who object need to ask the question: is there any biblical reason why we have to stop this. The fact that you might not like it is not sufficient. The fact that you might think it will lead to something else is not sufficient. Back in 1944 we agreed not to be bound by any assembly's decisions when they went beyond the truth of Scripture. We might complain that other federations are caving in to culture in their interpretation of Scripture, but we need to beware lest we cave in to a culture of our own creation over the last fifty years. Scripture alone is normative. So this is the challenge: where is the clear biblical data that should prevent a woman from offering her preference to her consistory when officebearers are being elected? I am convinced that the Scriptures do not permit a woman to have a leading authoritative role in the church, as I've shown elsewhere; but I see nothing in Scripture that forbids them from stating a preference in an election of officebearers. If we can provide conclusive evidence to that effect, the case is closed. If we don't, we have no choice but to leave the matter in the freedom of the churches.